Many sensitive data are generated by resource-limitation devices in the Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). When these data are divulged, people 's life and property will be threatened. To solve these problems, Wei et al. proposed a lightweight privacy-preserving protocol based on RSA assumption for VANET and they claimed that their protocol was secure and low overhead. In this paper, first of all, we show that the basic signature scheme to be used in Wei et al.'s protocol is not secure, i.e., the user's private key will be revealed from the pairs of message-signatures, which causes the protocol to be insecure. We also show that our security analysis is feasible and effective in practice from the theory and experiments. Then we construct a new identity-based signature scheme based RSA assumption and prove it is existentially unforgeable under the chosen message attack without random oracle. Finally, we update the Wei et al.'s protocol and do some experiments to evaluate the efficiency of our scheme in the updated protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The internet of things(IoT) is a future network that connects everything [2] . Unlike traditional internet made up of computers, various hardware devices, sensors and computers are connected to form the network in the IoT with the development of communication technology and wireless technology. This enables the application of intelligent computing in people's lives to be realized [3] - [6] .
Although IoT brings a lot of convenience to people, many security problems also emerge. First of all, people's sensitive data such as location privacy, identity privacy, and personal preferences are exposed to IoT. Then, if hackers control some components in IoT, it will not only damage people's property, but even threaten people's lives [7] - [12] .
Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is an important branch of IoT. It can improve vehicle and road safety, traffic efficiency, and convenience as well as comfort to both drivers and passengers. At the early stages, Road Side Unit(RSU) and On Board Unit(OBU) make up VANET. OBU represents the moving car. It can be the vehicle-mounted system, mobiles of driver etc. RSU is a roadside infrastructure. It can be traffic lights, streetlights, etc. One OBU node communicates with The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie. another distant OBU node by sending the message to nearby RSU nodes. RSU nodes can collect information about nearby road conditions, communicate with OBU nodes and communicate with other RSU nodes [13] . With the development and popularization of cloud computing, VANET uses the cloud to do complex computing. Because of the cloud, people can use VANET to plan driving paths, regulate traffic, monitor traffic accidents, etc. Obviously, the current VANET consists of RSU, OBU and cloud [14] .
However, there are many attacks in the VANET. S.S. Tangade et al. divided these attacks into 17 categories: Passive Attacks, Insider Attacks, Insider Attacks, Outsider Attacks, Malicious Attacks, Rational attacks, Local attacks, Bogus Information, Alteration Attacks, Sybil Attack, Denial of Service (DoS), Identity Revealing, Black Hole, Message suppression, Timing Attack, Tunneling and Social attack [15] .
To protect the security of communication information and hide OBU identity privacy under the limited computing resource, Wei et al. [1] proposed a lightweight privacypreserving protocol based on the RSA assumption. Furthermore, the protocol uses an identity-based signature(IBS) scheme from RSA. IBS is a type of signature scheme which allows users to verify others signatures without exchanging private or public keys, without keeping key directories, and without using the services of a third party [16] . In IBS, users' public key is generated from users' identity information like name, address, e-mail, etc. As far as we know, Guillou et al. proposed the first IBS scheme based on RSA [17] . Xing et al. extended Guillou et al.'s scheme and proposed an IBS scheme with message recovery from RSA [18] . Herranz et al. used Guillou et al.'s scheme to design an identitybased ring signatures from RSA [19] .
A. CONTRIBUTION
We analyze the security of Wei et al.'s protocol and find a security defect in the IBS scheme [1] on which the protocol depends. Then, we analyze the impact of the security defect in the IBS on the protocol [1] and find that an RSU node can get the private keys of the OBU nodes with which it communicates through the common modulus attack. Moreover, we prove that the common modulus attack is feasible and effective in practice from the theory and experiments. Next, we propose an improved IBS scheme to replace Wei et al.'s [1] to resolve the security defect. We give the updated details of the protocol after applying the improved scheme and prove our improved IBS scheme is secure against chosen-message attack without random oracle. At last, we analyze the efficiency of our identity-based signature scheme in the updated protocol.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest part of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we introduce some necessary basic knowledge. In section III, we review the protocol proposed by Wei et al., analyze its security and measure the difficulty of implementing the common modulus attack in this protocol by doing theoretical derivation and experiments. In section IV, we propose an improved IBS scheme to resolve the defect. Besides, we prove our IBS scheme is secure against chosen-message attack without random oracle. We apply our IBS scheme to the VANET protocol [1] in Section V. Finally, we conclude our work in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARY
Here, we recall some basic knowledge that will be used.
A. EXTENDED EUCLIDEAN ALGORITHM
The Euclidean algorithm is an algorithm for solving the greatest common divisor of two given integers.
Let a and b be two integers. Without loss of generality, let a ≥ b. For a = bt + r, where the integers t and b > r ≥ 0, we have gcd(a, b) = gcd(b, r).
More details about the Euclidean algorithm can be found in [20] . Here, we extend them to lots of integers.
Definition 1: We define gcd(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) as the greatest common divisor of integers a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n .
The extended Euclidean algorithm is an extension to the Euclidean algorithm. It has the following result [21] :
Given integers a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n and let d be the greatest common divisor of them. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute integers s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n that satisfy a 1 s 1 + a 2 s 2 + . . . + a n s n = d.
B. THE ASSUMPTION OF RSA PROBLEM
We give the following definition of RSA problem with reference to [18] .
Assume n = pq, where p and q are two large primes. For an element y ∈ Z * n and a prime number e such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, it is difficult to compute an element x in Z * n such that x e = y mod n, where φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1). RSA Assumption: We define that the RSA assumption is a (t R , R )−RSA assumption if the probability of any adversary solving the RSA problem is at least R in time t R .
C. COMMON MODULUS ATTACK
Here, we describe the common modulus attack [22] in brief. Suppose an adversary gets two different ciphertexts c 1 = m e 1 mod n and c 2 = m e 2 mod n of for the same m, where (e 1 , n) and (e 2 , n) are two public keys of two users and gcd(e 1 , e 2 ) = 1. Then it can use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the plaintext m as follows.
It first computes r and t such that e 1 r + e 2 t = gcd(e 1 , e 2 ) = 1.
Then, it can compute: c r 1 c t 2 = m e 1 r+e 2 t mod n = m gcd(e 1 ,e 2 ) mod n = m. We will use the attack to analyze the IBS scheme [1] in section III.
D. IBS MODEL AND ITS SECURITY MODEL
The model of IBS [1] is described bellow.
• Setup: The key generation center (KGC) generates the system public parameters PP and the system master secret key sk.
• Ext: For any user with its identity id, the KGC generates its private key sk id and sends it to the user secretly.
• Sign: For any message m, a user uses its private key to produce a signature σ m .
• Ver: Any user can a signature σ m of a message m if if the algorithm Ver outputs 1; Otherwise, the σ m of a message m is invalid. Next, the security model of IBS defined by Wei et al. [1] is as follows.
In the security model, the adversary can issue limited queries of private key generation for identity set U and signatures for challenge identity id * / ∈ U . • Setup: The challenger generates the public key and gives it to the adversary.
• Query: The adversary adaptively does the following queries and the number of queries is limited.
-The adversary randomly chooses u 0 identities
The challenger answers each query-identity id i by running Ext algorithm. -The adversary selects a challenge identity id * = id i (i = 1, .., u 0 ) and randomly chooses l messages m 1 , . . . , m l with respect to id * . The challenger gets the private key of id * by running Ext algorithm.
Then, the challenger runs Sign algorithm to compute the signature for each message.
• Forgery: The adversary generates a valid signature for id * and m * (m * = m i ). Definition 2: We call the IBS scheme is (t, )−secure if the probability of any adversary breaking our scheme is at least in time t.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
Wei et al.'s protocol is constructed by using one identitybased signature (IBS) scheme and two outsourcing algorithms [1] . At first, we review the IBS scheme and find a security defect in security analysis. Next, we show the impact of the security defect in the IBS scheme on the protocol [1] . At last, we estimate the difficulty of carrying out the common modulus attack to the protocol in practice by doing theoretical derivation and experiments.
A. RECALL OF THE IBS SCHEME
The IBS scheme [1] is defined bellow.
• Setup: Assume n = pq, where p and q are two large primes. Select a random element g ∈ Z n , hash functions H : Z 2 n → Z n and H 0 : U × Z n → Z n , where U is the identity set. pk = (g, n, U , H , H 0 ) is the public key and sk = (p, q) is the master key.
• Ext: Select a random element v id ∈ Z n for identity id ∈ U . Then, compute w id = H 0 (id, v id ) and
• Sign: Given a message m ∈ Z n , the signer id randomly chooses r and computes
The signature of message m is (v id , r, σ ).
• Ver: A message receiver accepts the message m with a signature(m, v id , r, σ ) if
Otherwise, the message receiver rejects it.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE IBS SCHEME
In the subsection, we show how an adversary A uses the common modulus attack to forge a valid signature for the IBS scheme constructed by Wei et al. [1] .
According to the security model of IBS scheme, after the adversary A receives the challenge identity id * , it can continue to query signatures of some messages.
It randomly chooses some messages m 1 , . . . with respect to id * . The challenger C computes these signatures ((m 1 , v id * , r 1 , σ 1 ), (m 2 , v id * , r 2 , σ 2 ), . . .) by running Sign algorithm, and sends them to the adversary A. A computes all H (m i , r i ) and stops querying when gcd(H (m 1 , r 1 ), . . . , H (m j , r j )) = 1. Since there exists an efficient algorithm to compute s 1 , . . . , s j such that H (m 1 , r 1 )s 1 + . . . + H (m j , r j )s j = 1, which is in section II, A can get the following value, private key of the user.
Thus, A can generates a signature of any message after it computes the private key g id * of the user. The privacy preserving protocol in VANETs [1] based on the outsourcing computations and the IBS scheme, so the protocol also is insecure.
C. SITUATION OF IMPLEMENTING THE COMMON MODULUS ATTACK IN PRACTICE
From the previous description, it can be concluded that the condition for performing the common modulus attack in the protocol is to obtain a sequence of message/signature pairs (m 1 , (r 1 , σ 1 )), (m 2 , (r 2 , σ 2 )), . . . , (m j , (r j , σ j )), where
We view the hash function as random function, therefore, the output of the hash function is random value. If gcd(, . . . ,) = 1 holds, it requires to a large number of signatures which exceeds the limitation of the number of the queries, the common modulus attack for the IBS scheme [1] is difficult to implement in practice. To estimate the difficulty of carrying out the common modulus attack for the IBS scheme in practice, we do the theoretical derivation and experiments.
1) THEORETICAL ESTIMATION
Here, we first recall a Theorem 1 which refers to [23] .
Theorem 1 [23] : The probability that two integers should be prime to one another is 6 π 2 , where π is the circular constant. To estimate the possibility of the common modulus attack implemented to this protocol in practice, we give the Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: Let a 1 , . . . , a i (i ≥ 2) be random integers, p is the possibility of gcd(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i ) = 1. Then p must satisfy:
Proof: Assume three envents: -1 : For any random integers a and b, gcd(a, b) = 1. -2 : There is at least one pair (a x , a y ) with gcd(a x , a y ) = 1, where a x , a y in {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i } (i ≥ 2). -3 : gcd(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i ) = 1. The greatest common divisor is 1, which is equivalent to relatively prime. So we can get Pr[ 1 ] = 6 π 2 according to Theorem 1. Thus
we can compute If there is at least one pair (a x , a y ) with gcd(a x , a y ) = 1 in a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i (i ≥ 2), we can get gcd(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i ) = 1. But there may be no one pair (a x , a y ) with gcd(a x , a y ) = 1 in a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i (i ≥ 2), if gcd(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a i ) = 1. So we can know 2 ⊂ 3 and Pr[ 2 ] ≤ Pr [ 3 ] . At last, we can get
When i = 3, p ≥ 94%. This means that the adversary with a probability 94% at least can succeed to compute the user's private key, when it get 3 signature/message pairs. So the common modulus attack is easily implemented in the protocol.
2) EXPERIMENT ESTIMATION
We use experiments to measure the difficulty of implementing the common modulus attack for this protocol in practice. We randomly choose 10 1024-bit integers and 10 2048-bit integers as the modulus. For each modulus, we randomly choose 100 sets integers and the greatest common divisor of each set is 1. For each set of integers, we calculate the coefficients that make their sum be 1 and count the running time. We do our experiments by using Java on the Win10 operation system over a computer with Intel I7 8550U CPU and 16 GB memory. TABLE 1 shows the results of our experiments. The results show that it is very easy to implement the common modulus attack for the protocol in practice.
IV. IMPROVED SCHEME
To resolve the defect of the IBS scheme [1] , we improve and propose a new IBS scheme for the protocol [1] . Moreover, we prove our improved IBS scheme is secure against chosenmessage attack without random oracle by using the security model proposed by Wei et al. [1] , which has been described in section II-D.
A. IMPROVED IBS SCHEME
The details of our improved IBS scheme is as follows:
• Setup: Assume n = pq, where p and q are two large primes. Select a random element g ∈ Z * n , hash functions H : Z 2 n → Z n and H 0 : U × Z n → Z n , where U is the identity set. pk = (g, n, U , H , H 0 ) is the public key and sk = (p, q) is the master secret key.
• Ext: Select a random element v id ∈ Z n for identity id ∈ U . Then compute w id = H 0 (id, v id ) and g id = g 1 w id (mod n). The private key of id is (g id , v id ).
• Sign: Given a message m ∈ Z n , the signer id randomly chooses r ∈ Z n , a ∈ Z n and computes σ 1 = (g id ) aH (m,r) mod n,
The signature of message m is (v id , r, σ 1 , σ 2 ).
• Ver: A message receiver accepts the message m with a signature (v id , r,
holds. Otherwise, the message receiver rejects it.
B. SECURITY PROOF
Before proving the security of our IBS scheme, we first recall the following lemma [24] , which will be used. Lemma 2 [24] : Given x, y ∈ Z * n and a, b ∈ Z such that x a = y b , one can efficiently compute z ∈ Z * n such that z = y gcd(a,b) a . Theorem 2: If (t R , R )− RSA assumption holds, the signature scheme is (t, )−secure and
where (e, y, n) is the given RSA challenge,e is a large prime, c Z is a constant that depends on Z n , u 0 is the number of private key queries and l is the number of signature queries. Proof: Let A be an adversary and C be a challenger. Then security game between A and C is constructed as follows. C is given RSA problem (n, e, y) and needs to find a z that satisfies y = z e mod n. Let H 1 , H 2 be chameleon hash functions, U be the identity set and u 0 be the number of identities chosen by A. for w j , where w j is randomly chosen such that gcd(w j , e) = 1 and let w = u 0 j=1 w j . Then, C sends public key pk = (g, n, U , H , H 0 ) to the adversary A.
• Query. The adversary A can make a polynomial number of the following queries: -Query of private key. The adversary A randomly chooses u 0 identities (denoted by U 0 = {id i : i = 1, . . . , u 0 }) to query. To answer the query, the challenger C makes w id j = w j and uses the trapdoor to driver v id j from w id j = H 0 (id j , v id j ). Next, C computes
where e id j = w/w id j . At last, C returns the private key (g id j , v id j ) for the identity id j (j = 1, . . . , u 0 ). -Query of signature. The adversary A selects a challenge identity id * = id i (i = 1, . . . , u 0 ) and randomly chooses l message m 1 , . . . , m l with respect to id * . The challenger C randomly chooses number b 1 , . . . , b l and set w id * = e. Then, C drivers v id * from w id * = H 0 (id * , v id * ) and r i from H (m i , r i ) = b i w id * . Next, C randomly chooses number a 1 , . . . , a l from Z n and computes
At last, C returns (v id * , r i , σ 1 i , σ 2 i ) as the signature of message m i .
• Forgery. For the change identity id * , the adversary A forges a valid signature (v id * , r, σ 1 , σ 2 ) of a message m 0 , where σ 2 = g a mod n and σ 1 w id = σ 2 H (m 0 ,r) mod n. In other words, σ 1 e = y waH (m 0 ,r) mod n. So x is the answers of the RSA problem (n, e, y) and the challenger C solves the RSA problem. In the case of gcd(aH (m 0 , r), e) = 1, the challenger C can construct a solution to solve the RSA problem. Because the probability of gcd(a, e) = 1 is e−1 e and the probability of gcd(H (m 0 , r), e) = 1 is e−1 e , the probability of gcd(aH (m 0 , r), e) = 1 is ( e−1 e ) 2 . Thus, we can get that the probability of breaking our scheme is
Assume the time of exponentiation on Z n is c Z , so we can compute that the time of breaking our time is t ≈ t R −c Z (u 0 + l). Thus, our IBS scheme is secure against the chosen identity attack and the chosen message attack.
V. OUR IMPROVED PROTOCOL
We first recall the outsourcing algorithm in [1] , and then construct our improved protocol.
A. OUTSOURCING ALGORITHMS
Wei et al. proposed two outsourcing algorithms for exponential operation u a (mod n) to a cloud server [1] .
Algorithm 1 (A1)
Assume u is public and a i is secret, where i = 1, . . . , n 0 . The algorithm uses a untrusted cloud server to compute u a i .
• Setup. At first, the client randomly choose a number a 0 and computes and saves u a 0 . Then, the client sends a i − a 0 and u to the cloud server.
• Outsourcing computation. The cloud computes u a i −a 0 and returns the result to the client.
• Output. the client computes u a i = u a 0 · u a i −a 0 .
Algorithm 2 (A2) Assume u and a i are secret, where i = 1, . . . , n 0 . The algorithm uses a untrusted cloud server to compute u a i without revealing u and a i .
• Setup. At first, the client randomly choose a number a 0 and computes and saves u a 0 . Then, it randomly chooses a 2 × 2 invertible matrix H . Next, it sends a i − a 0 and
to the cloud server, where r i is randomly chosen and l is any small integer, such as 2.
• Outsourcing computation. The cloud server computes B i = A a i −a 0 i and returns the result to the client.
• Verification and output. The client computes C i = H −1 B i H and gets (C i ) 11 , (C i ) 22 . It first checks whether (C i ) 2 11 = (C i ) 22 or not. If it holds, then this means (C i ) 11 = u a i −a 0 . The client outputs u a 1 = u a 0 · u a i −a 0 .
1) COMPATIBLE WITH OUTSOURCING ALGORITHMS
Our scheme can also use the Wei et al.'s outsourcing algorithms [1] to reduce computational overhead. We have σ 1 = (g id ) aH (m,r) mod n = A 2 (g id , aH (m, r)), σ 2 = g a mod n = A 1 (g, a).
B. OUR CONSTRUCTION
We replace the original IBS scheme [1] with our improved IBS scheme in the protocol [1] . FIGURE1 shows process of signature and verification in our updated protocol. The detail of our updated protocol is as follows:
• Setup: TA chooses two large primes p and q, a random element g ∈ Z * n and collision resistant hash functions H : Z 2 n → Z n , H 0 : U × Z n → Z n , where U is the identity set. Then, TA computes n = pq. At last, TA sets the system master secret key sk = (p, q) and public key pk = (g, n, U , H , H 0 ).
• Key Generation: This step is divided into three substeps.
-TA chooses e, d such that e · d = 1(mod φ(n)) and let e public. Then, TA make d be the secret key. -OBU randomly selects x OBU and computes v OBU = g x OBU . Then OBU selects k, computes
, then TA can make sure that v OBU and ID are real identification of OBU. Ultimately, TA computes w OBU = H 0 (ID, v OBU ) and sends private key g OBU = g w −1 OBU to OBU. Here, TA can use the above outsourcing algorithm, then g w −1 OBU = A1(g, w −1 OBU ), g OBU = A1(g, w 2 ) and v −w 1 OBU = A2(v OBU , −w 1 ).
-RSU builds its own public encryption algorithm Enc RSU with public key and secret key (pk RSU , sk RSU ).
• Key Generation for Re-signature: TA randomly chooses s OBU and computes A1(g, s OBU ) = g s OBU . RSU's re-signature key for OBU is (ID, g s OBU , y OBU ), where y OBU = d · w OBU · s OBU . Meanwhile, TA appends ID, g s O BU to a list T which can be used to trace the OBU's real identity.
• OBU Signature: The message m signed by OBU is m = ID type PL Time, where ID type is message type, PL is message load payload and Time is the accurate time of the message generation. OBU executes the following algorithms:
-For message m = ID type PL Time, OBU randomly selects a, r then executes outsourcing algorithms Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 to obtain σ 1 = (g OBU ) aH (m,r) mod n = A 2 (g OBU , aH (m, r)), σ 2 = g a mod n = A 1 (g, a) .
-OBU encrypts M = (ID, v OBU , m, r, σ 1 , σ 2 ) by using the public key of RSU and sends Enc RSU (M ) to RSU.
• Re-signature: RSU gets M = (ID, v OBU , m, r, σ 1 , σ 2 ) from Enc RSU (M ), and checks whether = σ 1 H 0 (ID,v OBU ) mod n or not. If the equation holds, then RSU can use re-signature key to compute σ 1 = σ 1 ry OBU and broadcasts (m, r, σ 1 , σ 2 rs OBU , σ 2 ), where σ 1 = A1(σ 1 , ry OBU ), σ 2 rs OBU = A1(σ 2 , (rs OBU )).
• Verification: (m, r, σ 1 , σ 2 rs OBU , σ 2 ) can be verified by any party. If (σ 1 ) e = (σ 2 r·s OBU ) H (m,r) holds, the verifier returns 1, Otherwise, the verifier returns 0.
• Tracing and revocation: TA does the tracing process.
TA and the RSU execute the revocation process together.
-Tracing. If (σ 1 ) e = (σ 2 r·s OBU ) H (m,r) , TA can trace the real identity of the corresponding OBU. TA uses its secret key and outsourcing algorithm A1 to compute r −1 (mod φ(n)), a −1 (mod φ(n)) and
then TA gets the corresponding ID, g s OBU from local list T . -Revocation. Once TA discovers a malicious vehicle OBU,TA sends g s OBU to the RSU to cancel this OBU. What's more, TA and RSU delete ID, g s OBU from list T .
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY
We analyze the effect of our improved IBS scheme on the efficiency of Wei et al.'s protocol [1] .
• Storage Cost. Because of the size of the public key, the master secret key and user's private key is not changed, storage cost is not changed after using our improved IBS scheme.
• Communication Cost. In our improved IBS scheme, there is one more σ 2 for each signature. So the signature of our scheme is 1024 bits longer than the original IBS scheme [1] and the data sent by the OBU to the RSU increases to 3360 bits.
• Computation Cost. The Setup step and Ext step of our improved IBS scheme are the same as the original IBS scheme [1] , so we only need to analyze the computation cost of Sign step and Ver step. We choose different length of modulus n and count the time that running Sign step and Ver step 1000 times need in the two IBS scheme. We do this experiment by using Java on Win10 operation system over a computer with Intel I7 8550U CPU and 16 GB memory. According to TABLE 2, although our improved IBS scheme consumes three times as much time on the signing as the Wei et al.'s IBS scheme [1] , it is still acceptable.
Furthermore, TABLE 2 also shows that our improved IBS scheme and Wei et al.'s IBS scheme [1] take the same amount of time to verify the signature.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first showed that there was a security defect in the IBS scheme [1] that the protocol depended and attackers could use the common modulus attack to get the user's private key. Then, we analyzed the impact of the security defect in the IBS scheme on the protocol [1] . In addition, we theoretically and experimentally proved that the protocol was vulnerable to the common modulus attack in practice. Next, we proposed an improved IBS scheme, updated the protocol and proved our scheme was secure against chosenmessage attack without random oracle. At last, we analyzed the efficiency of our scheme in the updated protocol.
